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Executive Summary 
This report is a qualitative evaluation of the Community Oriented Policing 
program that exists in the Seward neighborhood of Minneapolis, MN. The evaluation 
was conducted over a period of 6 months from June of 1999, into December of the same 
year. Most of the data collected comes from participant observation and some research 
about the program from articles, interviews, and other media forms. 
Community Oriented Policing (COP) is a new form of police involvement that 
strives to work with the community to strengthen ties between the police and the people 
they serve to achieve new levels of safety and crime prevention. The idea appeared first 
in the 1970's and 80's and has received increased notoriety with the government's 
support of new policing programs. Since its creation COP strategies are in place in cities 
and villages across the United States and around the world. 
The COP program embodies many varied outlets of policing like community 
oriented program like block club organization, to regular meetings with the public to 
increase communication and awareness about crime in the various areas that are 
protected. The key factors that distinguish Community Oriented Policing from other 
policing strategies are: a proactive policing stance, adherence to a problem based 
strategy of crime fighting, community involvement, and increased visibility on foot or by 
other means. 
Although the program is a seemingly logical "next step" in policing, it has come 
under some opposition in recent history. The key to a successful COP program comes in 
the evaluation of the process, and this can sometimes be the missing link in other less 
successful attempts. The two main methods by which to measure the success of a COP 
program stem from the adherence to either the Total Quality Management (TQM) model, 
or the Scan Analyze Response Asses (SARA) model. Each evaluating method has its 
pros and cons, TQM being less costly but less revealing of the community element, and 
SARA being more costly but more in-depth. The obvious solution remains that an 
evaluation of both techniques should be used for further evaluations. 
In Minneapolis, the city responded to the COP. initiatives by creating the 
CCP/SAFE side of the police force. This group of police officers, originally created by 
citizens of a local area neighborhood, grew into a broad and effective crime fighting and 
community building unit in Minneapolis. The new system of analysis in the area has also 
brought a new level of information on the number and types of calls being placed 
throughout the Minneapolis area, and is working to support a city wide COP program, 
while sometimes stifling more localized efforts. 
The Seward neighborhood is one of these neighborhoods that have had some 
difficulty in gaining momentum for its COP program, in part because of the existing 
system of police coverage. Its.relative location in the 3rd precinct of Minneapolis, has not 
favored a high amount of police manpower in the neighborhood, especially due to the 
comparative level of crime with the neighboring community of Phillips. 
Despite its difficulty in starting, the COP program has developed into a well 
designed and highly specialized program in Seward that continues to support the plans of 
the well organized neighborhood group, SNG (Seward Neighborhood Group). With 
careful guidance from SNG the COP program has become an effective tool in crime 
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prevention and community building that furthers the neighborhoods safety and well-
being. 
The program in Seward is comprised of an SNG lead task force comprised of two 
beat officers from the 3rd precinct, two CCP/SAFE officers, and a team of talents from 
SNG that can each target specific crime problems associated with the neighborhood. The 
task force meets weekly to discuss the issues of safety and neighborhood problems that 
might have occurred, and which need solving. By adhering to SARA guidelines, the task 
force has quickly brought solutions to many problems before they turn into repeating 
occurrences. In addition to the task force, the two beat officers received a high amount of 
patrol time in the neighborhood so as to become more familiar to the residents and the 
wrong doers of the neighborhood. 
Together each member of the task force, and the residents of the neighborhood, 
through block club interaction, work together to address problems as they arise. The 
interaction is beneficial to everyone involved building a stronger tie between not only the 
community and the police, but also between SNG and the community. 
The success of the program in the long run will take continued support from the 
police department as well as that of the community. Community Oriented Policing is just 
what it says, and it takes a strong sense of community to be able to make it work to its 
full efficiency. In addition to this, SNG also needs to monitor its position in the program 
and decide on what level of involvement is necessary for the neighborhood group to play 
in this issue, in order to avoid too many responsibilities. Continued communication, 
education, and specialization will be key issues for the task force to target, but most of all 
the group must focus on partnering for prevention as it has done in the past. 
Crime knows no boundaries and despite obvious demographic differences 
between Seward and its neighbors, the neighborhood needs to join forces to solve 
problems whose roots stretch beyond the peaceful garden of Seward. Through continued 
evaluations done in various formats, the COP program will continue to burgeon into 
making Seward and hopefully all of the Twin Cities a safer place for all. 
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Every day we encounter them. Roaming our streets and sifting through our back alleys, 
they are always there when trouble arises. Scarcely a moment goes by when we feel out of the 
reach of their "long arms." They are our police officers, the appointed keepers of peace in our 
communities and cities. Throughout their history and around the world, these safe-keepers of our 
cities and the police departments to which they belong have been working tirelessly for the 
common good. These men and women in blue keep our streets safe and to provide a secure 
environment for all people, as well as pioneering and developing effective strategies for 
preventing and fighting crime. Their strategies can be as diverse as the people and communities 
they serve. 
Today, the concept of Community Oriented Policing (COP) has risen to challenge past 
views on policing and to reestablish the goals of a new era in which we are working together to 
build a safer sense of community. The ideas put forth by the philosophy of COP are as old as 
policing. What remains to be seen and analyzed is how effective the COP program can be on a 
national level and, like in the Seward Neighborhood, on a local neighborhood level. 
The effectiveness of the COP program in crime prevention and safety can be measured in 
a number of ways, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In my evaluation of the program in the 
Seward Neighborhood, most of my findings have been based on participant observation and 
supported research from various articles and texts. During a 6-month internship with the Seward 
Neighborhood Group (SNG), I was able to thoroughly observe the COP program and gather solid 
data on the effectiveness of it from a qualitative standpoint. 
The resulting data and observations from this internship are intended to help SNG in 
evaluating the effectiveness of the COP program, as well as to assist them in considering other 
possible directions for the COP program in Seward and elsewhere in the Twin Cities. 
"A rose by any other name" 
The saga of Community Oriented Policing. 
The varied names and functions of the COP program all tie in to one main concept, as 
stated by Weaver: "This philosophy is rooted in the belief that the police and the public are equal 
partners in resolving crime problems and improving the quality of life at the community and 
neighborhood level." The beginnings of this philosophy emerged during the l 800's, almost one 
hundred years prior to the emergence of beat officers or problem-oriented policing. 
"The police are the public and the public are the police." These few words, uttered by 
Robert Peel in 1829, paved the way for the entire face of policing as it is known today. Peel's 
efforts within the police system are astonishing not because he established the first police force in 
London, England, but that the guidelines on policing which he laid down would later create the 
foundation for Community Oriented Policing today. His ideals for policing were founded on the 
basis that police officers are appointed to their positions, as members of the community in which 
they work to protect. Given the densely packed living spaces of industrial English cities, it is no 
wonder that the packed streets of London were the first to see the new forms of policing. 
When policing arrived in the United States in the l 840's, the industrial landscape that had 
begun its spread across the greater London area was still a number of years off. The first police 
officers in the U.S. were nothing more then figureheads, appointed by elected officials as favors. 
It took until the tum of the century for any sort oflasting reform to be seen in the U.S., but by 
this time the shape of the force was changing. 
With the introduction of the automobile, police officers were far more mobile, but so 
were the residents of their cities. By the early 1920's, police officers were putting forth their best 
efforts in fighting crime by patrolling and walking the beat. These early crime prevention efforts 
provided a level of visibility of the police to would-be criminals ~nd allowed a certain amount of 
inter-personnel involvement between the officers and the members of the community. This 
visibility would eventually become a key principle in the future of Community Oriented Policing. 
The 1930's saw a fall in the level of community involvement as the police departments 
chose to measure their success in terms of managerial strength rather than crime and safety 
regulation. The typical police officer handled more crimes and issues than any other member in 
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any other branch of the justice system did. Each officer used a certain amount of discretion in 
judging whether to prosecute offenders, even if it was clear that they had perpetrated the crime. 
However this idea of each officer acting as a detective in solving recurring crimes would no tbe 
lost with the translation to future COP efforts. 
It wasn't until 1967-8 that people began to realize the extent of the ineffectiveness of the 
police departments, due to a lack of communication between the precincts and the places in 
which they served. The 1968 National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders clearly sited the 
lack of police effectiveness with existing strategies and called for a nation-wide change in crime-
fighting tactics. The early 1970's saw the arrival of Community Oriented Policing in the form of 
foot patrols, team policing and the beginnings of community outreach by the police department. 
Most of this was in response to an overworked police department that was unable to handle anti-
war sentiment rising from the Vietnam conflict and the beginnings of the de-industrialization 
period in the urban landscape. People, in general, were afraid to convene in public places and it 
was time for a renewed police response. 
By the early 1980's the police had begun to experiment with t~e new community based 
policing tactics, but most of the results were mixed at best. While some departments reported 
decreases in crime figures, others reported that the resulting coverage was still inadequate to the 
communities' needs. This was later discovered to be caused by another serious problem when in 
1988, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that on-duty police officers were only spending 10% 
of their time on crime related activities. This was seen by the police departments as an 
ineffective amount of resource allocation, and led to many police officials losing some faith in 
the COP philosophy. 
Given the history of the police in the U.S., citizens had many myths and preconceived 
notions of how the police system worked and how much authority and power it held. The police 
were faced with a huge task of directing their attentions less on the departments' needs and more 
on the communities, while still attempting to strike an economic balance to serve and protect. 
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The COP program today 
The current situation of the COP program embodies many elements of the previous years 
of community policing, from Robert Peel's fundamentals to the beginnings of the Community 
Patrol Officer Program or CPOP program in New York City. The main idea of Community 
Oriented Policing is to embrace the community through partnering and prevention in order to 
bring a feeling of safety and comfort to the community. The most common way to do this is to 
directly involve the use of beat officers in specific neighborhoods to create liaisons between the 
police department and the community. These officers, on foot, in the patrol car, or on bike, act 
not only as officers of the law but also as members of a unique community that were overlooked 
by the previous methods of the police department. Another clearly visible sign of Community 
Oriented Policing is just that: visibility. This can be obtained by manpower, through physical 
means, like the use of sub-stations, or by psychological means, like working with community 
outreach programs. In some extreme cases, cities have funded police departments by 
implementing citywide video surveillance cameras in key locations. Although it is not likely that, 
the cameras would catch much crime on tape, the mere presence of a camera, like the presence of 
community patrol officers, is enough to deter any wrong-doers. 
In other metropolitan areas, the program can take on many characteristics of the 
communities that they are protecting. In San Mateo, California ( south of San Francisco) the 
police department has taken on a well-rounded and broad initiative into COP strategies that 
clearly reflect the area they serve. After reviewing other techniques and practices put forth by 
other cities looking to implement COP, the sheriff of the city designated Community Patrol 
Officers (CPO's) in conjunction with a new system of police strategy. These deputies focus on 
the following guidelines that are both a general set of strategies as well as a reflection of the 
types of community programs vital to the San Mateo area and its community: 
1. Community Based Programs started only by the police department are bound to fail. 
2. CPO's are designated positions within the department, much like that of a detective. 
3. CPO's will still act as Deputy Sheriffs and feel free to implement pro-active 
enforcement. 
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4. Use flexible hours based on the community and various other player institutional 
needs, ( e.g. the court system). 
5. Concentrate on human interaction, especially on foot and face to face. 
6. Support statistical analysis of neighborhood crime and make it available to the public. 
7. Use three main patrolling techniques: foot, bike, and auto. 
8. Develop a working relationship with the press. 
9. Establish and maintain the neighborhood watch programs. 
10. Establish a safe house system for school children. 
11. Target areas around schools for criminal activity that can spill into the surrounding 
area. 
12. Monitor and review traffic accidents and probes and maintain communication with 
the California Highway patrol and the road department. 
13. Keep flexible program goals that benefit the community, and strengthen relationships 
with allied agencies to be prepared for problems beyond the scope of the police. 
14. Continue to evaluate the program throughout all stages. 
Using these guidelines as a basis for the COP strategy, San Mateo also created a number 
of diverse and effective programs designed to encourage the community to work together with 
the police. Gun Buy Back, Train Safety, Juvenile Bicycle Helmet Education, Red Curb 
Prostitution Abatement, along with a multitude of other p,rogram designed to improve the quality 
and safety of the community through multiple institutional involvement. Together, these 
programs coupled with a strong desire by the San Mateo police department to adhere to the 
guidelines of Community Oriented Policing have proven to be an effective force in crime 
prevention and improving the quality of life. 
What separates the cops from COP? 
Since the advent of Robert Peele's strategies on law enforcement, the face of crime has 
continued to change with the pace of society. The difficulty of trying to prevent crime continues 
to be a problem even for a diverse program like COP that constantly changes to reflect the 
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community that it serves. To the observer, the challenge of distinguishing the difference between 
COP and non-COP strategies can prove to be as difficult as determining one set of strategies for a 
COP program. 
There are telltale factors that define COP regardless of place or situation. The first is the 
switch from reactive policing to proactive crime prevention. This involves targeting the 
problems that are causing the crimes instead of simply trying to arrest every perpetrator in hopes 
of locking them all away or pushing them somewhere else. Each officer acts as a detective of 
sorts, always aware of the situation and the community of which he is a part. Another defining 
trait of the COP program is the general problem solving across institutions that never existed 
before the community oriented philosophy emerged. Also, there is no specific set of steps to 
follow or actions to be taken for individual crimes. COP can be altered to fit all the diverse 
policing needs, from rural communities to inner-city neighborhoods, and still be shown as an 
effective solution in crime prevention. 
Measuring effectiveness in the COP Program 
Total Quality Management: 
Economics and Policing 
The basis behind implementing any new strategy in policing is to create an effective 
program designed to achieve specific goals and standards of safety and efficiency. The COP 
program operates with this design but can be very difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons. 
Community Oriented Policing strategies are not typically set in stone, as we have seen 
from the history of the program. What one police department may view as inherently problem 
oriented policing may actually be a tiny portion of another's community-based policing 
philosophy. The difficulty comes in determining how to view the specific effectiveness of each 
program, and how they might correlate towards larger trends. 
To first understand the many facets of how previous COP programs have been evaluated, 
it is essential to understand the two main strategies involved in making the COP programs work. 
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Each strategy can be targeted to evaluate the effectiveness of a COP program, despite their 
different approaches to the implementation of the COP philosophy (see table 1). 
The first strategy involved in COP implementation is referred to as the Total Quality 
Management approach, or TQM. "The TQM philosophy has three basic elements: teamwork, 
participative management, and continuous improvement in quality and productivity." (FBI 1997) 
TQM, is a widely accepted strategy for improving customer-oriented business and the relations 
they have within their own institutions in an economic setting. The model has been refitted to 
involve many branches of the federal government including the police department, whom many 
feel have forgotten about the customer. The TQM model has been evaluated throughout many 
case studies in the U.S. as it focuses largely on the upper levels of police department 
management. Most of these case studies were conducted to evaluate the extent to which police 
departments were implementing COP into their policing strategies after having received federal 
tax dollars to support the program. 
In most of the evaluations the TQM model took a large amount of qualitative data from 
the Chief of the Police Department, or the highest ranking commanding officer in the 
department. It is hoped that by determining the level of managerial involvement in the COP 
program, the rest of the department can also be evaluated to fall somewhere under the parent 
philosophy of the commanding officer. The remainder of the department was surveyed as to how 
much time and resource was being implemented towards COP strategies. 
In the case of Whiteville, NC, the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin conducted an extensive 
study into the effectiveness of COP implementation. The study first laid out the groundwork for 
the city, stating its population demographics and supporting industrial base including income 
figures. The study went on to mention the relative importance of the town as a county seat, and 
cite the importance of the city as a commercial hub hosting, "nearly 10,000 to 20,000 people per 
day who come to shop or to obtain services." Then the study quickly examined the extent of law 
enforcement in the town and a brief mention of the structure of the officers and their relative rank 
and power. 
The study set out to prove that the successful implementation of TQM strategies was the 
main engine behind the successful COP program in place today. The case study cited the 
experience that the chief of police had in using the TQM strategy to implement top down change 
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throughout the department. The true effectiveness of Whiteville's COP implementation was 
attributed to a form of inter-department election in which the officers were given the choice to 
pursue this type of policing after having received the pros and cons. The TQM model suggested 
that all of the officers have a fair say in the decision of implementing the new strategies and the 
adherence to these guidelines was seen, in the study, to signify a success. 
The case study also went on to site the importance of the CEO's of local supporting 
corporations and their support of the program, however this stems mainly from the issue of 
financing the program and rebuilding a larger sense of community among the businesses and 
residents of Whiteville. TQM modeling suggests that not only should the police department look 
to improve its own capacity to handle the COP practices, but also to reach out to other financial 
and potential providers of resources to maintain a higher level of efficiency. Loosely translated, 
this entails corporations supporting the police department through donation, or communities and 
neighborhood group putting in volunteer hours to aid the police and strengthen their community. 
The basis of this study was largely qualitative but based on survey response and in person 
analysis. Although the mechanism involved was the TQM model, it is important to note that the, 
model was evaluated from a broader perspective concentrating on the police system as a whole. 
Since the aim of the study was to determine whether or not the implementation of the program 
was successful, then the case study employed a good use of surveying and information gathering. 
The end of the case study began to analyze the pros and cons of the program and its future in the 
city. However, it concentrated strictly on the police department's ability to implement change 
and progress, ignoring much of the human and community involvement that goes into a program 
like COP. 
SARA, the human element unveiled 
The community element is sometimes more clearly understood in the second strategy, 
which is known as SARA or Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (see table 1). These 
simple guidelines form a basis for officers and other people involved in COP programs to follow 
in the fight against crime. By evaluating this strategy it is possible to see how the officers are 
handling the problem oriented side of the program though their interaction with the community. 
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This type of evaluation targets the officers in general and allows for specific case studies of 
certain incidents, and how each crime is effectively dealt with following the guidelines laid out 
by SARA and COP strategy. 
A case study of Virginia Lake, Nevada (a suburb of Reno) sought to examine the ability 
of COP to effectively maintain reduced crime levels after the initial implementation into the 
neighborhood. This case study also begins with a quick demographic overview of the 
neighborhood, listing its apartment towers, mean income in the lower tax bracket, and the 
structures of local economy, including strip malls and a large park. The study then switches 
directly to the formation of the COP strategy within the department in the 1980's and how it 
developed into today's system. Through this study, it is clear to see the process that the Reno 
police department went through in implementing SARA and COP strategy. The department 
began by scanning the situation and discovering that somewhere around 10,000 calls had been 
made from the region. They continued the scanning process by examining the types of calls and 
by surveying the residents and officers about their efforts in dealing with crime in the 
neighborhood. The police then continued the process by, analyzing the calls and responses to 
determine the type and scale of each problem that needed to be dealt with in the neighborhood. 
In many cases the problems revealed where largely unrecognized by the police before the 
initiative. The Response phase, after consulting the residents to find an overwhelming amount of 
public support in the program, began with specific action in coordination with the owners of the 
properties of the various apartment complexes in the neighborhood that had been singled out as 
problem sources. In the Assessment phase, the police evaluated the effectiveness of their actions, 
and measured them by the decrease in 911 calls, and the decrease in the efforts in the officers in 
keeping the peace in Virginia Lake. 
The steps taken in typical evaluation format resemble the following. 
Scan - Examining the frequency and types of calls placed about local crime issues. 
Analyze - Reviewing each of the key target problems and searching for deeper 
problems, in this case it was troubled apartment complexes. 
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Respond - The police, with community support, contacted the owners of the apartment 
towers to target a host of related problems through undercover work and/or re-evaluating 
leases. 
Assessment - The police measured the effectiveness of their actions by the decrease in 
911 calls. 
In this case study the SARA model followed the four steps in succinct order, but this does 
not always have to be the case. The actual steps involved in the SARA model do not have to 
follow the exact order listed in the table. After evaluating how effective this one specific 
solution had been, the police department could have skipped back to the response stage and tried 
a different mean with which to attack the problem. The key to viewing the whole process as 
successful would rely on how often the Reno Police department evaluated the effectiveness of 
their new strategies after each new solution. 
The entire case study found the COP program to be effective based on the adherence to 
the SARA model from this example and a few others. Most of the data was qualitative relying 
on responses from the officers and the community. The study also examined many of the 
quantitative aspects of the evaluation like survey response, and cost effectiveness. Together the 
whole model for evaluating the program was appropriate in its depth and involved far more of a 
community aspect of the COP program then the TQM model entailed. 
Other studies using SARA have been conducted on a case by case basis and compiled by 
the National Law Enforcement Agency. In this case a broad call for incidents and how they were 
dealt with was issued to law enforcement agencies across the U.S. in order to determine the 
scope of COP strategies implemented in practice. Despite finding that most agencies knew of the 
principles of COP and implemented the first two phases of SARA, the study found that most law 
enforcement agencies were still limited by other conventional practices that prohibited the 
effective response phase of the model. The study was conducted completely by survey, and then 
the results were largely quantitative analyzed only siting a few examples when discussing the 
survey and its complexity. Certainly a sample like this, isn't the most effective way of 
determining the true efficiency of a COP program nation wide as, each individual response may 
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have had far more compelling circumstances surrounding it. However, the survey was a good 
enough indicator for the continued financing of the COP initiative at a federal level. 
Conflicting methodology and its consequences 
In most cases of previous evaluations, the results of the analysis have been based largely 
on quantitative data and results to draw conclusions. In the case of TQM, this can be a far more 
effective way of analyzing data across many departments and interactions. For the SARA 
approach, despite some quantitative evaluations, by and large the results of the evaluations have 
been based on case examination and other qualitative results. However, most policing 
institutions are effectively using both the TQM strategy and the SARA strategy simultaneously. 
Due to time and monetary constraints, there are very few case studies that recognize both facets 
of the COP program on a large scale, but it is possible and likely more valuable to attempt to 
observe both models and their effectiveness when viewing COP programs, especially on a more 
local level. 
There are some conflicts that stem from conducting evaluations in this form that are tied 
to the limited focus of the studies. To understand a complicated scheme like the COP program, 
one must first consider the geographic setting in which the program is functioning. Most current 
case studies spend some time evaluating the demographics of the region, but not the essence of 
the surroundings, or the history of the area and its crime statistics and problems. By concentrating 
on either the management aspect through TQM or the individual response through SARA, there 
are many facets and considerations that can be missed both socially, politically, and especially 
geographically. Many of the other problems of current evaluations stem from their excessive use 
of quantitative results to draw their conclusions from. This too can be an oversimplification of a 
scenario that is usually anything but simple. 
The most perplexing component of the current evaluations of the COP program stem 
from a lack of focus on the neighborhood's work in implementing the program. Although there 
are undoubtedly, countless localized evaluations of COP programs, much like the Whittier model 
in Minneapolis in the early 1990's, however they are rarely recognized in any larger more 
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comprehensive studies. The fact that most evaluations and case studies have left out the 
"community" element in Community Oriented Policing, can be some what distressing, but also 
prove to be too costly for most surveying purposes. In general most of the evaluations have 
focused largely on the police department and their abilities to implement COP strategy, but this is 
only half of the equation 
Minneapolis as a case study 
A brief history 
Perhaps the best way to see how each model and its evaluation process is conducted, 
would be on a more familiar environ, Minneapolis. In Minneapolis, the Community Oriented 
Policing Philosophy has taken a slightly different character then seen elsewhere in the U.S. The 
state of Minnesota has always been one to try new ideas in all areas of life and when the city 
began to look at new techniques, outlined by federal programs for improved policing in the cities, 
they took the opportunity. In the 1970's Minneapolis was one of the first cities to adopt beat 
officers in the CBD to deal with an increase in what are referred to as quality of life crimes. 
These consist largely of vagrants, blight, prostitution and other misdemeanors. These crimes 
remain the main focus of the beat officers, stemming from the belief that improving the safety 
and comfort of the community will drive out less desirable lifestyles. The "Minneapolis Beat," 
as it is still known today, proved to be a successful model for officers getting a chance to interact 
with the community. The success of the Minneapolis beat had some influence in prompting 
other beats to emerge around the neighborhoods and precincts. However, from 1976 to 1981 the 
Police Department hit a hiring and promotional freeze that kept a lot of officers in their beat 
positions for a long time. The upside to this was an increased familiarity between the beat 
officers and the communities they were protecting. However, this would also cause a certain 
experience gap that would continue into the policing situation today. 
The creation of CCP/SAFE 
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At the same time that the police department began founding its new strategies, many 
diverse communities in Minneapolis were ready to assist in the effort against crime. Starting in 
1979, a group of civilians in North Minneapolis grouped together to create what would later 
become the main foundation for COP in Minneapolis for the next 20 years. The program was 
known as CCP/SAFE or Community Crime Prevention/ Safety For Everyone. Although the 
program started with civilian support, a few years later the MPD decided to adopt the CCP/SAFE 
team into the normal police force. This caused two main impacts on the face of Minneapolis. 
The first substantial impact was to strengthen the organization of the neighborhoods around 
Minneapolis into more autonomous units that could function as independent bodies under the 
umbrella of Minneapolis. Within these neighborhoods, CCP/SAFE set out to create block clubs 
that could build a new sense of community block by block, and also help to make the transfer of 
information from the police to the public a little smoother and vice versa. The second major 
impact was the division of the police department between the CCP/SAFE team and the normal 
MPD. Although it rarely led to a fight over resources, there was, for a time, a sense of mistrust 
between the MPD comprised of officers with some years of experience and the largely civilian 
unit created to function as equals. 
As time passed CCP/SAFE and the MPD began functioning together and after a few 
changes in management to both the CCP/SAFE team and the MPD both sides had regained any 
lost respect that might have been felt previously. By and large the MPD appreciated the work 
that CCP/SAFE was doing, take care of the community aspect of policing by keeping case 
histories, organizing prevention oriented events for the block clubs and take care of a lot of the 
"nitty gritty" that normal police officers were faced with. This allowed the MPD officers to 
concentrate more on crime prevention and taking a proactive stance against crime citywide. 
Yet even the best plans can go awry and Minneapolis was faced with new and different 
problems. In the late 1980's Minneapolis was facing the all to common side effect of a 
successful city economy: gangs. Amidst the crisis it was suggested that the chief of police 
refused to accept the surmounting problem, and the officers were powerless to engage in 
different more effective crime fighting techniques for this situation. The disposition of the 
officers was a lesson well learned and the police department resolved to strengthen its 
13 
effectiveness by implementing its own COP strategies. By 1994, The Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act was passed, which provided funding for 100,000 new police officers, also 
spurring more police departments into considering the possibilities of this new approach to 
policing. Minneapolis, among other cities, also applied for more funding to expand its growing 
COP initiatives. 
Minneapolis today 
Today Minneapolis has three key elements in effectively policing each of the precincts; 
the Police Officers, the CCP/SAFE and a recent system known as CODEFOR or Computer 
Optimized Deployment - Focus On Results. Between these three elements the city has 
experienced a significant decrease in crime over the past number of years. 
The Police department's use of CODEFOR has also proven to become a vital part of the 
policing effort in Minneapolis as a model for officer allocation and for crime fighting 
effectiveness. This recent system, first tested in 1993, deals with mapping out the number of 911 
calls made in a certain precinct and then allocating man power and resources to the specific area. 
The program has become the main stay of the department and it has enjoyed a fair amount of 
success in quickly targeting problem areas. 
The Minneapolis Police Department is also aided by various other institutions created by 
both city and state. Due to the high amount of rental properties in some areas of Minneapolis, 
the police also work closely with the Truth in Housing Inspectors and other more specific 
branches of community and neighborhood safety groups as called for by each location. 
In addition to the support from various law enforcement agencies in Minneapolis, the 
CCP/SAFE and Minneapolis police receive assistance from state and national programs of 
various levels of involvement. The restorative justice program aided by the Urban League in 
Minneapolis, or the Initiative for Violence Free Families which target specific aspects of crime 
like domestic violence also help to prevent crime from neighborhood to neighborhood. All of 
these groups and institutions that gather their funding and inspiration from various levels of 
government and politics come together to create the picture of law enforcement in Minneapolis 
as we know it today. 
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How effective has Minneapolis been? 
In an evaluation done by the FBI of the status of the Twin Cities area COP program, a 
quantitative study of the program was conducted based on survey response. The case study came 
in response to the 1994 crime bill, in an attempt to discover the true effectiveness of the program 
nation wide. The report done on Minneapolis was almost completely based on survey response 
of the various branches of the two police departments in the Twin Cities, including St. Paul. The 
FBI report omitted a few key factors about the Minneapolis/St. Paul area, mainly that both cities 
had created special COP units within their Police Departments. The results of their evaluation 
found that the Minneapolis police department was implementing close to 50% of the COP 
strategies. The surveys relied mainly on a loose implementation ofTQM and SARA practices 
within the various branches surveyed. 
For the purpose of the evaluation of the program, the means justified the ends in that the 
results proved that Minneapolis and St. Paul were indeed implementing COP strategies as a part 
of normal policing. It is important to look at what the results of the survey might have looked 
like if the study was conducted by observing either the TQM approach or the SARA approach in 
greater detail. 
Had the surveying method focused on the TQM approach of the program, the results of 
the survey may have shown a rather different, perhaps even contradictory result. Most of the 
Minneapolis, and St. Paul police departments, do not employ the ideals of COP in their everyday 
policing strategies, preferring to maintain the existing CODEFOR strategies along with normal 
departmental policing strategies. The TQM, done quantitatively might have revealed less then 
10% of the Twin Cities police force implementing COP strategies. However, qualitatively the 
effectiveness of the program could have identified the existence of CCP/Safe and addressed the 
split in Policing strategies within Minneapolis. The one main draw back to the use of the TQM 
model in Minneapolis would be the lack of neighborhood organization, and progressive political 
thinking that goes into making the COP program a success across the city. 
Had the study been conducted by analyzing the adherence to the SARA program, it would 
have been far easier to see the depth of the COP program by quantitative methods and especially 
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qualitative ones. The difference here lies in the philosophy of the beat officers in Minneapolis 
that has developed from years of problem oriented policing experience with the beat patrols and 
the CCP/SAFE units. One other difference that would have gone unnoticed by a TQM analysis, 
would have been the importance that CODEFOR can play in supporting SARA in relating 
information across all of the key levels of the program. The use of SARA would also have 
identified more of the community element in the program, but only through further qualitative 
investigation that can be lengthy and costly. 
It is also possible that the SARA model in the case of Minneapolis might also have found 
contradictory results. Had the officers surveyed only consisted of the normal beat officers, the 
survey would not have revealed many of the SARA strategies in practice, since these are most 
left to the crime prevention methods of the CCP/SAFE team. Confusing as it may seem, it goes 
to show that no one evaluating method can identify the true extent of COP and its effectiveness 
against crime. 
It would seem that the best combination of methods for an effective evaluation of the 
COP program would entail both the SARA model and the TQM model, drawing from both 
quantitative data and qualitative data. However, the depth and diversity of the COP program 
from city to city can change the face of each evaluation, and it all must focus on what can be 
deemed effective about COP from region to region. This question is what will best dictate the 
level of surveying method and type of information gathered. The main issue that can not be 
overlooked is the focus on community, especially in a neighborhood like Seward. 
COP and the Seward Neighborhood 
Location, location, location ... 
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Within the comprehensive system of the Minneapolis police rests the Seward 
Neighborhood. Tucked away to the southeast of Minneapolis, Seward is bordered by the highest 
crime rate in all of the Minneapolis area but is proud to display some of the lowest crime 
statistics for the third precinct. Its population is a significant racial mix of Middle class 
Caucasians and East Africans who still remain somewhat segregated from one another. The rest 
of the population is comprised of students from the near by universities and other residents living 
with disabilities. 
The neighborhood is partitioned by a major interstate to the North, a busy commuter road 
to the west, the Mississippi River to the east and a loose boundary near some railroad tracks to 
the south. The area is divided, primarily, by Franklin Ave., which runs East-West across the 
neighborhood. Along Franklin Ave. lies most of the shopping and apartment complexes, and 
acts as an entry into the neighborhood bringing commuters, pedestrians, shoppers, and residents 
from 9-5 during the working week. In the evening Franklin becomes home to a different 
population as it can become the passageway for local inebriates, and vagrants. The north half of 
the neighborhood (North of Franklin) is mainly apartment complexes, housing most of the 
neighborhoods ethnic and transitional population. The Southern half of the neighborhood is 
primarily middle class homeowners and rental duplex owners. Along the western and southern 
boundaries of Seward are some of the low to middle level industrial areas concentrated on the 
outer rim, constituting warehouses and other prosperous low level manufacturing. 
Most of the commerce and industry in Seward comes from these businesses, from the 
shops and low to medium level commerce along Franklin. The neighborhood also supports a 
centrally located park and recreational/educational center as well as a transitional school in the 
southern part of the neighborhood. All this within the confines of a few square miles. 
The timeless tale of Seward and its COPs 
The Seward neighborhood has always been a close knit community even before the 
geographic boundaries were placed on the landscape. For years Seward has been a politically 
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active and forward minded community always searching for new and better ways to improve the 
quality of life for all of its residents. Thanks to the creation of the Seward Neighborhood Group 
and Seward Redesign, (SNG and SRD), the neighborhood has always had a strong sense of 
community and prominence in Minneapolis. 
The two non-profit organizations have been the lifeblood of the community in Seward for 
the past 40 years. SNG is responsible for community outreach, environmental planning and other 
social aspects of the community, but most of all they are responsible for the implementation of 
the Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP) fund allocations. From these roles, the 
neighborhood group has found itself in an interesting and active position within Community 
Oriented Policing. Despite periodic contact with CCP/SAFE and Seward Redesign's efforts with 
the Rental Housing Association, SNG had never experienced much direct contact with the 
policing situation in the neighborhood prior to the COP implementation. 
For many years Seward had shared their western border with the Phillips neighborhood. 
This neighborhood was home to some of the highest crime rates in all of Minneapolis and had 
been a source of great frustration for the police. Since both neighborhoods remained in the same 
precinct throughout for some time, most of the police's attention was focused on the Phillips 
neighborhood. With the implementation of CODEFOR, Seward found itself with very little 
police protection due to the frequency of calls coming from the neighboring Phillips 
neighborhood. These calls pulled most of the police manpower out of Seward leaving some 
residents feeling a bit uneasy. SNG took a responsible step and decided to campaign with the 
third precinct to implement a COP program in the Seward neighborhood. 
The police department accepted the idea and positioned two permanent beat officers in 
Seward for a year to see how the COP program would work out. SNG did their part to help with 
the newfound relationship between the neighborhood and the police and purchased two bicycles 
for the beat officers to promote their visibility in the neighborhood. After about a year, the two 
beat officers were repositioned out of the neighborhood, as is policy for the MPD to do 
periodically, however this went against one of the fundamental issues of COP, visibility and 
familiarity. If the two beat officers that the neighborhood had grown to accept were to leave and 
be replaced, the whole relationship that the community had built with the officers would have to 
be regrown from the start. 
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The transition was inevitable, but the future of the program was not, and SNG lobbied 
once again to gain two new beat officers that might be able to remain in the neighborhood for 
some time. The police department formed a compromise and assigned two new beat officers to 
the Seward Neighborhood who could be called off to answer calls in the Phillips neighborhood. 
With the addition of a new CCP/Safe officer, Seward was now prepared to move into a new level 
of the COP program and begin to evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative. 
COP in Sewar~ today 
Today the program takes on many dimensions as a result of two permanent beat officers 
assigned to the neighborhood, two CCP/SAFE Officers, a COP task force formed by the 
neighborhood group, and various other members from the Rental Housing Association, the 
SCCA (Seward Chamber of Commerce Association), Block Club leaders, and the residents of 
the neighborhood. Each week the COP task force meets with the beat officers, the CCP/SAFE 
officers and any other members of the neighborhood who wish to voice a concern about crime 
and safety in their area. These meetings generally last about an hour in which the task force 
discusses the recent crime occurrences in the neighborhood and crime prevention strategies. Not 
surprisingly, most of the meetings follow general SARA guidelines for determining problems in 
the neighborhood and how best to go about dealing with them. 
To best demonstrate how the COP program works in Seward it would be beneficial to 
observe the process through an example of how neighborhood problems and criminal activities 
are dealt with. In the fall of 1999, the task force received a call from one of the owners of a 
prominent industrial position in the southwestern part of Seward. The owner described how he 
felt that the bowling alley across the street from his new place of business was becoming a 
problem to be dealt with after a recent drive by shooting had occurred. After further 
investigation, the task force found that the establishment had a track record of 911 calls placed 
against it and that this should become a priority for the task force to deal with. The CCP/Safe 
officers were able to provide a detailed case history about the property for the task force to 
examine and the both of the beat officers had a previous knowledge of the establishment in 
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question due to their experience working there as off duty officers. The information provided 
from the police was also incorporated with the first hand accounts of the situation from some 
members of the task force who were also residents of the neighborhood. 
After all of the information had been presented, the task force began to decide what 
would be the best course of action to take against the establishment to prevent any further 
occurrences. After a week had past, the next team meeting revealed the depth of specialization 
that the task force could offer as the group reviewed what type of offenses the owner of the 
bowling alley might be committing. The officers and CCP/Safe officers had their own 
suggestions along with the knowledge of the SNG members of the task force who were 
experienced in dealing with property issues. The task force decided to act on the issue by 
arranging a meeting with the owner of the establishment to discuss the future of his business. 
The final decision of the task force was to send the beat officers and some of the SNG 
team along to discuss the problems that his business was causing. After some discussion, the 
owner of the business decided to change a few things with the hours of the business and the typ~ 
of clientele he was attracting to prevent any further problems. After a few weeks, the number of 
calls on the property was significantly reduced to close to zero and the bowling alley was no 
longer a problem to the neighborhood. 
Was it worth it? 
The example of the task force's actions in dealing with the situation highlights the many 
varied relationships that have been created and strengthened through the COP program. I would 
like to focus on three main relationships of the COP program and how they have benefited by the 
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presence of COP: the police and the neighborhood, SNG and the neighborhood, the community 
and the neighborhood. 
The Police and the Neighborhood 
Perhaps the most obvious relationship that a program like Community Oriented Policing 
creates in Seward is one between the Police and the Neighborhood. The main goal of the COP 
philosophy is to strengthen the amount of community 'involvement and understanding between 
the police department and the neighborhood that they serve. In Seward, the role of the beat 
officers and the CCP/SAFE team have both contributed to a new level of safety and 
communication through this new found relationship. 
The first major benefit of the relationship between the police and the neighborhood is the 
increase in communication. Knowing the effects that the CODEFOR system had implemented 
on the Seward neighborhood, the beginnings of the COP program began to bring a certain 
amount of visibility and familiarity to the beat officers. Residents began to feel more 
comfortable seeing the police in the streets. This was further strengthened with the attendance of 
the biweekly "Cop chats" set forth by SNG, in which residents began to communicate more 
freely with the police concerning about the safety and well being in the neighborhood. The 
increase in communication was also strengthened by the efforts of the CCP/Safe team in 
organizing block club informational meetings, seminars, and events. With these two forces 
working together the police were able to learn more about specific crime incidents in the 
neighborhood, and how best to deal with the problems presented in Seward. 
The new level of trust gained by increased visibility has also been beneficial in aiding the 
police to prevent further criminal activities. With the support of SNG, the neighborhood has also 
had success with many crime prevention programs designed to take advantage of the Block 
Clubs. For example, the many varied CCP/SAFE training sessions for crime prevention with the 
block club leaders, as well as broader crime prevention events like National Night Out. In a 
society were knowledge is power, the knowledge of crime prevention strategies by the residents 
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of the neighborhood will inevitably help the police in the efforts to protect the neighborhood and 
keep it safe. 
By using the residents as additional eyes and ears for the police, the new relationship 
formed between the police and the neighborhood has become somewhat more cost effective, 
relying more on the information provided by the residents regarding crime incidents and less on 
patrol hours. One example of this is the CODEFOR system. Originally designed with cost 
effectiveness in mind, it only works by registering 911 calls from the residents and later mapping 
out the crime patterns. Since the implementation of the system, both the police and the CCP/Safe 
officers have been trying to persuade residents to dial 911 as much as possible. However, the 
nature of most residents has been to reserve calling 911 for extreme emergencies. With the 
increase in communication between the Police and the residents, the number of 911 calls has 
increased, as residents are now aware of the new system of crime prevention thanks to the COP 
relationship. The continued success of COP and CODEFOR will not only strengthen the level of 
trust and security that the community experiences, but also add to a greater amount of attention 
directed towards the neighborhood. The tenuous balance that once might have become the 
undoing of a COP program fro Seward in the 3rd precinct can now be a powerful ally when used 
with the COP program. 
One other important relationship that has been forged is that between the police and the 
businesses in the neighborhood. The increased visibility of the beat officers in the neighborhood 
has also meant that the police can frequent local area merchants and hear their concerns about 
specific crime problems. One major problem that has affected Seward for some time is the 
problem of inebriates and vagabonds that reside in various states in front of the businesses along 
Franklin. These quality of life crimes are becoming effectively dealt with by the increased 
visibility and presence of the Beat officers. These actions can and have deterred the problem 
away from the businesses, but the issue runs far deeper than that of just the Seward 
neighborhood. However, the police presence also allows them to become more familiar with the 
repeat offenders, and helps them in dealing with various scenarios that unfamiliar officers might 
encounter. These strengths brought forth by COP further aid the police in building a stronger and 
safer relationship with the neighborhood. 
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The Seward Neighborhood Group and the Neighborhood 
It has been the goal of the Seward Neighborhood Group to engage in programs that build 
a greater sense of safety and community for the neighborhood since its creation nearly 40 years 
ago, and the COP program is a great source for strengthening this relationship. 
One of the key factors in the success of the Seward neighborhood group has been through 
the support of its residents. The COP program has been an excellent opportunity to not only 
directly address the needs of the residents and improve the quality of life for the community, but 
also to serve as an excellent spring board for making residents aware of the role that SNG can 
play in their lives. After having spent some time going door to door lobbying for continued 
support of COP in the neighborhood, I discovered that many residents in certain areas of Seward 
were unaware of the role that SNG assumes in their lives and how it could help them. The bi-
weekly COP chats that ensued throughout much of the program also drew a lot of support from 
the community. By bringing new members of the community into the SNG supported arenas of 
the COP program, many residents were able to see the effectiveness of the neighborhood group 
first hand and take part in building their community. 
In addition to the increased awareness of the neighborhood group that the COP program 
brought to the neighborhood, it also strengthened the existing relationship between the block 
clubs and SNG as each worked together to target crime. ·With the support of the beat officers, 
SNG was able to reach out to the block clubs and work more directly with them in searching for 
problem properties, training residents on safety, and improving the safety of their homes. 
Through this type of contact with the neighborhood, SNG has also been able to physically 
improve the quality of life for the neighborhood with small grants and funding for various crime 
prevention efforts like neighborhood lighting and possibly anti-theft systems, that would have 
been untouched before the COP program. 
The relationship between Seward and the community is not limited to the home owning 
residents either. The COP program has also brought about a stronger relationship between the 
local businesses through the SCCA and the various apartment towers to some extent, through 
building meetings with SNG and the beat officers. The increased communication between the 
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local commerce and SNG has not only helped to strengthen a stronger sense of community 
within Seward, but has also served to further other efforts of redesign by building stronger ties 
with the neighborhood group and SRD. One specific example of this can be shown in the 
relationship that developed between the Holiday Gas Station and SNG. Although already a 
member of the SCCA, the COP program brought the management of the establishment into close 
contact with the other facets of SNG, with the addition of the "cop shop" inside the station. 
Although not fully utilized for various reasons, the way station for the beat officers was 
somewhat effective in reducing the amount of crime at the Holiday, in as much as being a 
psychological deterrent. 
The support of the business community as well as the residential community for the COP 
program in Seward has truly strengthened the ties to SNG, in a remarkable neighborhood like 
Seward. 
The Community and the Neighborhood 
The true strength of the Seward neighborhood has always lied in the strength of 
community and its involvement to help one and other. When faced with crime it is only natural 
that one might see the strength that a program like Community Oriented Policing can and has 
brought to the neighborhood. 
The block clubs that have been established throughout the neighborhood have always 
been an excellent source of building communities within the neighborhood, and the issue of 
crime has undoubtedly been a unifying subject. Statistically, most of the significant crime in 
Seward has come from in home break-ins, or theft from auto, a great deal of attention has been 
spent on educating the residents about prevention and building neighborhood watches. The 
various block clubs were able to further strengthen there bonds by forming neighborhood 
watches and convening regularly to discuss issues of crime and safety that would later be 
reported to SNG or the CCP/Safe officers. This chain of events gave each block club a chance to 
gain more and more influence with one and other to further build the residential networks. 
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To a lesser extent, the main apartment towers within Seward have also had a unifying 
experience offered by the COP program. After a few incidents of assault, of various natures, 
residents began to attend regular meetings to determine the truth of what was going on in their 
buildings. This lead to an increase in communication with the police and also to an increase in 
communication with one and other, building on the established philosophy of, "Know thy 
neighbor." 
Although crime is not a pleasant issue to bring a community together on, it will 
undoubtedly occur. However, the Community Oriented Policing format not only addresses the 
issue of safety in the community, but it also brings the community closer together. Since it is the 
goal of the Minneapolis Police department, SN G, and the community of Seward to improve the 
safety and quality of life for the neighborhood, it seems vital that Seward continue with its 
program of Community Oriented Policing into the future. 
The Future of COP in Seward 
With the relative success of the Community Oriented Policing program in Seward, the 
program must be constantly evaluated to ensure its continued success into the future. With the 
help of evaluations like this one, and others put forth by other independent groups, the complete 
process of SARA can be fulfilled to further add to a successful COP relationship. From these 
evaluations come new ideas that can either advance the COP program down new avenues, or 
possibly improve on existing ideas and techniques. 
Specialization of the task force 
One of the key ideas in a COP program is to solve problems proactively and dynamically 
by involving more then just the existing police presence to tackle problems. In the Seward 
neighborhood, multiple groups and institutions both inside and outside of SNG and the 3rd 
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Precinct often confront problems that directly affect the neighborhood. SNG has already 
developed multiple institutional problem solving by gathering various members of different 
expertise into the task force. Since SNG has so many facets in the neighborhood, like the Rental 
Housing Association, the SCCA, and the Seward Towers affiliates, the various members of the 
neighborhood group can use each of there specific knowledge bases to tackle various issues and 
problems that occur in the neighborhood. As the task force works in conjunction with the 
CCP/Safe officers and the beat officers, the entire web of crime prevention possibilities comes to 
light. However, it could be advantageous for Seward to further specialize the broad range of 
talents that its task force possesses to further enhance the problem solving power of the program. 
Within the last few meetings Dave Chapmann began to sit in on the task force meetings bringing 
with him knowledge of the SRD side of things along with a strong working knowledge of the 
SCCA members. This introduced a direct liaison to the business community in Seward, through 
which businesses might be able to voice their concerns on a more regular basis. The other 
advantage to having a representative of the business community sitting in on the meetings is 
represented by a practical working experience and knowledge of the business communities needs 
and concerns on issues that may arise. 
To this extent it might be advantageous to directly involve a representative of the other 
groups that are not as clearly represented by the task force. The first group that is not clearly 
represented in the SNG task force is the ethnically diverse portion of the population within 
Seward. SNG has, for a long time, made many efforts to come to a stronger relationship with 
this significant group of Seward's population. Although many of the initiatives taken by the COP 
task force have been translated into many of the other languages spoken in Seward, the message 
is often misconstrued as many members of the community are still unfamiliar with the role of 
SNG and the Community Oriented Policing movement. For this reason among others, it might 
be worthwhile to establish a direct liaison to the more significant Somali population and invite 
him/her to participate more directly in the COP task force discussions. This might be a project in 
and of itself, but it would be well worth SN G's time as a community building effort, and as an 
added force in the COP program. 
26 
The other branch of specialization in the task force might be to obtain a direct liaison to 
the apartment towers who can regularly attend the task force meetings. From time to time Loann 
Crepeau has joined the task force to either seek information on specific crime events, or 
provide insight as to how best to spread information to the residents of the Seward Towers on 
crime issue in the neighborhood. Understandably, it might be difficult for SNG to obtain 
someone with enough available time to handle this position, but it would also accomplish two 
main goals vital to COP. First, it would increase the communication and the awareness of the 
program within the diverge communities that reside in the towers. Second, it would also be 
another effort towards not only strengthening the community building relationships between the 
Towers and SNG but it would also target the same diversity group that could further add to the 
task forces strength in problem solving. 
The specialization of the task force could further be strengthened by each member of the 
concentrating on specific areas and issues within the neighborhood. This has already begun, to 
some extent, with the creation of a specific member of the task force answering telephone calls 
from block club leaders and following up on reports. This member of the task force is also 
specialized in rental properties so as to bring to vital skills to the task forces abilities. It is also 
obvious that the police department has also contributed to the COP program by assigning 
CCP/Safe officers to the area, although the task force is most frequented by only 
one of the officers. With the use of the CCP/Safe officers to tackle the more traditional side of 
the COP program, and the beat officers attending regularly all the involved parties cover many of 
the bases. 
The key idea behind all of this can be termed partnering for prevention. This is best 
described by using other existing institutions in something close to horizontal integration in order 
to solve major problems. For instance, when an issue like a problem property arises in 
Seward, all parties present in the task force can contribute to the analysis and resolution phases of 
the loose SARA model that is adhered to. The beat officers can use their patrol time and 
experience to identify the problem and later present a solution to the owner of the property. 
Also, the CCP/Safe officer, along with the SNG member of the task force directly related to 
problem properties, can review the history of the problem and decide on a best course of action. 
If the issue require more support or directive than the task force can provide, then the SNG and 
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CCP/Safe team members can contact the Problem Properties department to seek further 
resolution in the issue. 
Partnering for prevention 
Some problems that the neighborhood encounters can extend beyond the range of the task 
forces abilities and might require further partnerships. It has been said that crime knows no 
boundaries. With that in mind, coexisting next to a neighborhood that possesses that highest 
crime rate in the third precinct, it would seem inevitable that problems will present themselves 
from outside the boundaries of Seward as is typical of all urban settings. 
Recently the task force set out on a proactive campaign within Seward to target the major 
problems and safety related issues and take action against them in order of importance. The 
"dirty thirty" campaign as it was later coined, drew a handful of problems stemming from both 
inside and outside the neighborhood. The major issue that was decided upon was the inebriates 
and vagrants that frequent the streets. The problem is rather common, and well understood by all 
those in the neighborhood, that it didn't take long before the task force hypothesized that one of 
the main contributing factors to be the relative location of an alcoholic detoxification house on 
the Western Seward border. It was in the opinion of the task force that this, along with other 
contributing factors like the ethnic diversity of the offenders, were playing the most significant 
role in the high amount of inebriates along Franklin Ave. A course of action was decided upon 
and the beat officers, along with some members of the SNG task force, met with the leader of the 
mission to discuss its functionality. 
The steps taken in identifying the problem, analyzing the information, and acting upon it 
were all very true to typical SARA form. Yet, it would have been possible for the task force to 
cross even more institutional boundaries to seriously handle the problem at hand. At a first 
glance one might ask the question, why was Seward the only neighborhood to deal with the issue, 
if the establishment exists on the boundary? One answer comes from the fact that the Phillips 
neighborhood, (in fact very few neighborhoods), have the organizational strength that lies in the 
Seward neighborhood, which can make dealing with the area a bit difficult. However, SNG has 
worked with Phillips in the past, and its beat officers share some their patrol time with that 
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neighborhood. It might be advisable for the task force to further pursue more help from the third 
precinct on the issue, and consult with the Inspector about his feelings on the subject and what 
course of action could best be taken with police support. It would also be advisable to attempt to 
strengthen the relationship between SNG and the Phillips neighborhood, not only on the COP 
agenda but to use a program as diverse as this to encourage their organization with some help 
from SNG. Once again, this may prove to be too costly a measure, but Seward is just another 
neighborhood among many in Minneapolis, and perhaps it should open its policies to include 
neighboring neighborhoods as time allows. 
One must also take into consideration the new light rail transit station that is going to be 
placed a few blocks from the source of this problem. Viewed by both communities as a source of 
prosperity in the surrounding areas, it would be to Seward's advantage to attempt to address this 
specific problem with the help of SRD, the 3rd precinct, the Phillips neighborhood, and any other 
city and county institutions that might be of some assistance in the matter before the station's 
completion escalates the necessity for resolution. 
The Longfellow neighborhood, which is substantially more suited to community 
organization that the Phillips neighborhood, could also prove to be a strong ally in the COP 
program. Considering that the demographics of the neighborhood are very similar to Seward's, 
both neighborhoods encounter many similar problems that might be better addressed by a 
combined effort. Issues like theft from homes and graffiti are easily targeted by both 
neighborhoods pooling their time and efforts to make the entire area crime free. The other 
advantage to this comes from the overlapping CCP/Safe coverage that would ensure some 
continuity. 
Working with CCP/SAFE 
One cannot speak of partnering for prevention without also discussing the role of 
CCP/SAFE in the COP program. CCP/SAFE, being the citywide response to the COP 
philosophy, has also joined the SNG task force in a slightly different form. Without the presence 
of the neighborhood group, the calls about crime and CODEFOR statistics would simply be kept 
and maintained by the CCP/SAFE officers assigned to the area, ready for any block club leader 
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that might request that information. However, with SNG in the picture many residents have 
begun to rely on the neighborhood group as their source for information on crime, instead of 
using the CCP/SAFE officers. This also manifests itself in the difficulty of information passing, 
as each week the task force member responsible for receiving calls from the neighborhood must 
also check with the CCP/SAFE officer to see which of their complaints are overlapping and 
which need to be addressed. Although it is practical that the task force can increase information 
flow in this way, the residents of the neighborhood still need to be inspired to contact the 
CCP /SAFE officers with crime problems after first calling 911. 
The other interesting dynamic of the relationship with CCP/SAFE stems from the 
experience that a designated COP program can offer. When the Inspector of the Third Precinct 
assigned two new officers to the Seward beat, he officers based on their ability to work with the 
community element of policing that Seward would present. This community element is inherent 
to the COP program and the CCP/SAFE program already in place in Minneapolis, making 
Seward's COP program an excellent training opportunity for future SAFE officers. Since the 
Seward beat strongly adheres to the COP philosophy common to the CCP/SAFE strategies, it 
might be beneficial for SNG to contact the CCP/SAFE officers and/or the 3rd precinct to make 
this a continued mission of Seward in aiding the development ofCCP/SAFE through COP. An 
early course of action might be to work with SRD to attempt to influence the relocation of the 
new CCP/SAFE headquarters from the 3rd precinct into the Seward neighborhood. 
Increase Communication with the Police 
Communication with the police department will also be an important factor in the future 
of the program. SNG has already part taken in limited communication by lobbying, and by 
speaking directly with the head of the CCP/Safe and 3rd Precinct at various times. It is important 
for SNG to keep its goals in line with that of the police department's views on the program to 
ensure the maximum amount of coverage both by police presence and community involvement. 
At present, both institutions may still be on different ideas about how best to deal with the COP 
situation in Seward and in the precinct. From a police perspective, there are far greater issue in 
other areas of the 3rd precinct that require more attention then the Seward neighborhood and its 
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relatively low crime rate. However, the nature of the COP program is to be proactive, and it is 
going to take both time and experience for the COP program to gain strength in the eyes of the 
police and in the eyes of SNG. 
There are many ways in which the COP program in Seward can gain strength and 
influence the communication level. On a neighborhood level, issues like visibility, 
communication, and organization are key to increasing the strength of the program. An initiative 
that focuses on luring residents to its support through results may find that it is a long slow 
process. SNG needs to continue its attempts at getting the whole community involved in the 
COP movement to become a proactive force against crime. 
The beat officers have been a strong and knowledgeable addition to the neighborhood, 
but there efforts are sometimes stifled by the needs of the precinct especially by time spent in the 
neighborhood. The early bike patrols that the COP program had entailed in Seward were a 
strong way to increase visibility and familiarity of the beat officers within the neighborhood. 
Another idea for increasing the visibility of the police in the neighborhood, would be to 
encourage the precinct to begin a more regular bus patrol as has been done in other COP 
programs. The visibility of officers, of either the police or of the Metro Transit system, whose 
police force are based in Seward, riding the bus routes along Franklin Ave. could increase the 
presence of COP to this vital line of transit within Seward. 
How much is too much? 
The main issue that will present itself in the future of the COP program in Seward is how 
much is too much? In most case studies of COP programs across the U.S., it is rare to see the 
involvement of a neighborhood group in the program. In fact the power of neighborhoods in 
Minneapolis is tremendous compared to other major U.S. cities, and the Seward neighborhood 
remains to be a well-organized symbol of this organization. The amount of influence and control 
that SNG has exhibited over the COP program must be addressed. 
In my opinion, the role of SNG in the COP program is ideal for the time being. They are 
both providing the strength of community in the neighborhood that is vital to the mission of the 
group and improving the quality of life through a diverse policing program like COP. Yet as 
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time passes, SNG will undoubtedly find itself in a position to take part in other neighborhoods 
and spread their influence across other social and political boundaries. With more contact comes 
more opportunity for recognition and responsibility in the Twin Cities. It is already common for 
SNG to practice what is commonly referred to as scale jumping, in which they overstep the direct 
political ties to the city and apply for grants and funding in much farther reaching regimes of 
state and federal government. However, how much of a role can SNG play when the issue of 
time and resource is at hand? 
It is important for SNG to maintain the 3rd precincts continued support of the COP 
program for many reasons already listed, but at what cost to them. On a federal level, several 
studies have already shown that a large percentage of COP programs were being paid for by the 
neighborhoods and not by the police departments. The issue of funding many of the beat 
officers' time and utilities has already come to light, and it is important for SNG to strike a 
balance between drawing support for COP and simply supporting the beat officers. For my 
period of evaluation, the issue was largely dormant, but it may continue to surface as the beat 
officers begin to get more closely involved with the COP movement and more frustrated with the 
amount of direct support to the COP initiatives from the 3rd precinct. This is where the issue of 
constant contact between the neighborhood group, and the Inspector of the precinct should come 
into hand. 
Beyond financial issues, the support for multi-institutional involvement, and the 
specialization of the task force may also prove to be a time consuming venture. However, it is 
vital that these contacts be made and maintained, without allowing SNG to pick up to many 
burdens or responsibilities from the other neighborhoods that it might assist. The COP program 
and SNG's organization will soon become strong enough to look beyond its boundaries and 
begin to help out its neighbors, for this is the goal of all communities regardless of boundary. 
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Conclusion 
The future of the COP program in Seward, much like the past, seems to be very stable 
and beneficial for the Seward neighborhood and the police department. Through continued 
support from the Police, SNG, and the community the program should become a shining example 
of how the COP philosophy can effectively be applied to any situation, and serve as a model for 
other neighborhoods. The key to the future of the program will lie in the evaluation of the 
program and the search for continuous improvement. 
In the fight to spread the light of community into the shadows of urban development, the 
Community Oriented Policing program should be seen as a spark to further the city wide 
development of this beneficial opportunity for community building in Minneapolis and the U.S. 
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What its used for 
Based on economic management 
principles, the strategy focuses on 
building stronger relations between 
the corporation and the customer, or 
the police department and the 




2. Participative Management 
3. Continuous Improvement 
Based on a 4 step process of dealing 
with crime, the strategy focuses on an 
individual or departmental basis to 
discover and respond to crime in an 
iterative format. Evaluation of the 
model stems from the amount of 
adherence to the guidelines below. 
Key elements: 
1. Scanning for problems 
2. Analyzing the situation and all the 
possible components 
3. Generate a solution and implement 
it 




- Focuses on 
Departmental and system 
wide effectiveness of 
dealing with COP 
- Process can be 
evaluated by quantitative 
methods and is cost 
effective 
- Identifies the extent of 
officer implementation of 
COP practices 
- Focuses largely on 
community involvement 
- Constant assessment of 
the process after each 
solution is obtained 
Cons 




members of a 
community 
- Lacks qualitative 
data 









- Focus can be too 
narrow, failing to 
recognize the 
history of the area 
or the institution 
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